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5G is becoming a global phenomenon and it is currently being implemented in a couple dozen 
countries including Finland. With it comes new information security challenges. The purpose of 
this work was to get acquainted with wireless communication technologies and the information 
security challenges they create from the viewpoint of 5G and its preceding technologies. Potential 
solutions for the challenges are also offered. 
This thesis is carried out as a literature review. Books, researches and scientific publications are 
used as references. 
The outcome of this research was an overview of information security challenges in 5G and in the 
technologies preceding 5G. Possible information security solutions are presented in this work for 
the new technologies coming with 5G. 
This work showed that the new technologies coming with 5G, such as the virtualization of 
hardware and services as well as the utilization of cloud computing, create completely new areas 
of attack for networks. With this knowledge, it is possible to prevent attacks targeting networks by 
implementing necessary information security elements. 
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5G:stä on tulossa maailmanlaajuinen ilmiö, jota tällä hetkellä ottavat käyttöön muutamat 
kymmenet maat Suomi mukaan lukien. Se tuo mukanaan uusia tietoturvallisuushaasteita. Työn 
tarkoituksena oli perehtyä langattomiin viestintäteknologioihin ja niiden luomiin 
tietoturvahaasteisiin 5G:n ja sitä edeltävien teknologioiden näkökulmasta. Mahdollisia ratkaisuja 
näihin tietoturvahaasteisiin on myös esitelty. 
Opinnäytetyö toteutettiin kirjallisuuskatsauksena. Lähteinä käytettiin aiheesta tehtyjä kirjoja, 
tutkimuksia sekä tiedejulkaisuja. 
Tutkimuksen tuloksena oli yleiskatsaus 5G:n ja sitä edeltävien teknologioiden 
tietoturvallisuushaasteista. Mahdollisia ratkaisuja tietoturvahaasteisiin on esitetty tässä työssä 
5G:n mukana tuleville uusille teknologioille. 
Työssä kävi ilmi, että 5G:n mukana tulevat uudet teknologiat, kuten laitteistojen ja palveluiden 
virtualisointi sekä pilvipalveluiden hyödyntäminen, luovat täysin uusia hyökkäyspinta-aloja 
tietoverkkoihin. Tämän tiedon avulla voidaan ennaltaehkäistä tietoverkkoihin kohdistuvia 
hyökkäyksiä ottamalla käyttöön tarvittavia tietoturvaelementtejä. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
5G technology has arrived upon us and it is starting to spread across the globe. The 
technology is here, and it will have information security implications. 
This thesis addresses the security problems that 5G has or might have in the future. This 
is a concern that will touch quite literally everyone who has or will have a 5G connection 
on their mobile phones, computers or other devices. It is a major concern in terms of 
Internet of Things (IoT) as well. Now is a good time to talk about this, for we are at the 
beginning of an 5G era. This era may last for quite a while, and 5G will most likely be the 
dominating wireless connection technology. This thesis also discusses technologies 
before 5G, and their security features and vulnerabilities. 
Since 5G is rather new technology, most of the information regarding 5G is from internet 
sources with some book sources used as well. One of the most used references in this 
thesis is the book A Comprehensive Guide to 5G security [1] as it is one of the few 
thorough books produced of this subject. 
The goal of this thesis is to go into the world of information security and try to give a good 
level of understanding about the new technologies affecting 5G security to anyone who 
reads this thesis. The thesis is divided into 7 chapters, 1st chapter being this introduction. 
The 2nd chapter of this thesis goes over the previous technologies with their security 
challenges and solutions. In this part the history of the technologies and when they were 
first introduced is discussed. The 2nd chapter starts with the pre-cell era, and goes 
through both 1G and 2G, as they are older technologies. In chapters 3 and 4 the wireless 
communication technologies of 3G and 4G are introduced, as they are widely in use. 
Chapter 5 presents the 5G enabling technologies and chapter 6 introduces the different 
security methods used in the new technologies coming with 5G and their solutions, as 
well as challenges in privacy. 7th chapter concludes the research into a comprehensive 
chapter where the findings of the new technologies coming with 5G are recapped. In the 
final chapter the future of 5G and its security is also discussed. 
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2 EARLY IMPLEMENTATIONS OF MOBILE 
TECHNOLOGIES AND THEIR SECURITY FEATURES 
5G is the fifth generation of wireless communication technology. To recap how the 
technology has developed in past years, this chapter will take a short look of the previous 
technologies that preceded 5G, namely 0G, 1G, 2G, 3G and 4G. This is done so we can 
build an understanding of what was, and why 5G is what it is today. 
2.1 Pre-cell era 
0G, also called pre-cell era, became available after the second World War. Mobile 
operators would have to connect the calls manually, and there were only few channels 
available at once. Mobile radio telephonic systems were the predecessors of first 
generation of cellular telephones, and two of the technologies that were used were 
mobile telephone service and improved mobile telephone service. The two analog 
technologies mentioned were direct continuations of each other and were developed for 
20 years from early 1960s to early 1980s. [2] 
2.2 First generation of wireless cellular technology 
Introduced first in 1979 to the world in Tokyo, Japan, 1G brought with it the first 
generation of wireless technology and analog cell phones. Two of most-used 
technologies were Total Access Communication System (TACS) and Advanced Mobile 
Phone System (AMPS). These systems provided handover and roaming capability but 
were unable to operate between different countries. 1G was extremely susceptible to 
eavesdropping, as it only required a receiver that operated on similar frequencies to 
listen in on the calls, so 1G had zero confidentiality in communication. [1,2] 
2.3 Second generation of wireless cellular technology 
The first version of Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) was released in 
1990, and it was first deployed in Finland in July 1991. The overall performance of the 
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system improved drastically when modulation schemes were changed from analog to 
digital. 2G cellular systems comprise of Digital-AMPS, Code-Division Multiple Access 
(CDMA), personal digital communication and GSM. GSM is the most widely used and 
successful 2G cellular network system, and targeted spectrum efficiency, international 
roaming, better voice quality, compatibility, ability to support new services and low mobile 
and base stations cost. 2G and GMS were very popular with users because of Short 
Messaging Service (SMS) and Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS), which enabled 
users to communicate more effectively among each other. The MMS especially was very 
popular with the users. Data speeds with GSM were up to 14.4 Kbps using circuit 
switched data. GSM technology serves as the base for next generation, 3G, systems 
and Long Term Evolution (LTE). There is also a standard called Interim Standard 95 (IS-
95), also called cdmaOne. IS-95 is the base for future CDMA 2000 technology, but since 
IS-95 is not so widespread, this chapter will focus solely on GSM. [1,2] 
2.3.1 GSM security 
Since GSM was the most used standard and remains to still be used to this day, though 
several countries have already began to phase out 2G [3], it is good to know more about 
this standard, as it is the base for future technologies. 
GSM is the first to use actual security methods, such as authentication, confidentiality of 
user identity, ciphering of data and the usage of Subscriber Identity Module (SIM). SIM 
is used to store subscriber information, which in turn is used to prove the identity of the 
device owner and the services the user is allowed to access. Authentication requires the 
user to confirm to the operator that they are a credible customer requesting the service. 
Ciphering is used to send data and signals in such a way, that hijacking any information 
would not be possible. GSM uses Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI), that is 
derived from International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), to grant users 
confidentiality. IMSI provides every subscriber in the world an unique number, up to 15 
digits, that carries the information of their home network and country it belongs to. IMSI 
is usually not sent to the operators when authenticating due to possible eavesdropping, 
instead TMSI is used, as it is a temporary number and that way of no use to outsiders. 
GSM also uses symmetric algorithms A3 and A8 between the GSM operator and the 
user, which means there is a single key that is used to encrypt and decrypt data. This 
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key is generated in the SIM. The algorithms have a one-way behavior, which means that 
the output can be found if the inputs are known, but not vice versa. [1] 
2.3.2 GSM vulnerabilities 
Although GSM is being replaced by Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service 
(UMTS) and LTE, it still offers the highest coverage, and in some places, users do not 
even have an alternative to choose from. This exposes many of the users to threats that 
arise from using an outdated standard. The openness of wireless communications 
makes the users communicating more vulnerable to security threats. GSM tried to 
harden the interception using several different techniques, such as frequency hopping, 
but it is still completely vulnerable to multiple different attacks targeting a part of the 
network. To list a few, GSM has vulnerabilities concerning man-in-the-middle attacks 
using a false base station, flaws in implementation of A3/A8 algorithm, SIM card cloning, 
over-the-air cracking and short range of protection. [4,5] 
Much has been done to combat vulnerabilities and GSM has had its gradual 
improvements during the years, that have led to versions such as GSM1800, high speed 
circuit switched data, enhanced data rates for GSM evolution and general packet radio 
service. The GSM improvements are continued in 3G systems, such as UMTS. Some 
solutions to the GSM security flaws include using secure algorithms for A3/A8 
implementations. This can prevent SIM card cloning attacks, and therefore securing the 
backbone traffic and implementing end-to-end security to the application layer. [5] 
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3 THIRD GENERATION OF WIRELESS CELLULAR 
TECHNOLOGY 
The planning of 3G systems was started in the early 1990s, and it was mainly developed 
by International Telecommunications Union (ITU), who proposed multiple things that are 
collectively known as IMT-2000. The objective was to implement blueprints for global 
harmony for mobile communication, which would be able to commence global 
interoperability by providing reduced cost. ITU set the requirements for data rates of 3G 
as follows: 2 Mbps in building or fixed environment, 384 Kbps for urban environments 
and 144 Kbps for vehicular wide area environments. Compared to 2G, the speeds really 
skyrocketed, and apart from the above requirements, the 3G systems were also intended 
to bring better quality of service across the board. [1] 
The two systems that were first introduced were UMTS and CDMA 2000. Both 
technologies comply with the speed requirements introduced by ITU. In 1998 a joint 
collaboration was formed and named 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), that 
serves as an umbrella for a number of standards, such as GSM, UMTS, LTE and 5G 
new rad. [6] The purpose of 3GPP originally was to develop UMTS along with other GSM 
standards. The first UMTS standards were published in 1999. The responsible for official 
standardization process of CDMA 2000 was a standard committee named 3GPP2. 
CDMA 2000 is a continuation for IS-95. [1] All of the 3G technologies are still widely used 
to this day. 
3.1 CDMA 2000 security  
There are a total of four entities engaging in the CDMA 2000 security architecture, and 
those include the home network with its home location register and authentication center, 
the serving network with its location register and mobile station controller, the mobile 
station and the User Identity Module (UIM), such as IMSI. CDMA 2000 uses similar 
Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) as UMTS, so it achieves mutual authentication 
by the user and the network. Both of those participants share the knowledge of a secret 
key, which is only available to those two. This subscriber key is either manually put in to 
the UIM or it is made with over-the-air service provisioning by calling a service number. 
The AKA is implemented in two stages. At the first stage the security credentials are 
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passed from the home network to the serving network. In the second stage a one-pass 
challenge-response procedure is made to achieve mutual authentication between the 
UIM and the network. [7] 
3.2 UMTS security  
As previously mentioned, UMTS is the continuation of GSM technology, so its security 
solutions are similar as well. UMTS security architecture is divided to five different sets 
of features. Network access security gives users secure access to the 3G servers and 
protects against possible attacks to the radio interface. Network domain security makes 
the signaling of data secure and it also brings protection against attacks aimed at the 
wireline network. User domain security handles the safe access to mobile stations. 
Application domain security verifies that the applications in both the user and provider 
domain can communicate with each other in confidence. Visibility and configurability of 
security gives security information to the users, and guidance regarding whether a 
certain security feature requires switching on. UMTS AKA is used in UMTS as well as in 
CDMA 2000. [1] 
3.3 3G vulnerabilities and Signalling System No. 7 
Vulnerabilities in newer technologies are becoming harder to find as network providers 
tend to not announce any flaws they might have in their systems, unless confronted, as 
it would compromise the security of the systems themselves. Since 3G technologies are 
still widely in use, making security flaws public knowledge is something that people 
should be careful with. However, as some of the vulnerabilities are already widely known 
and exploited, talking about them raises awareness and pressures network providers 
and even protocol developers, such as 3GPP and 3GPP2, to increase their security 
standards, whether by phasing out older standards such as 2G and 3G in areas where 
they are not needed or increasing the security mechanisms in those technologies. As 
going over every single vulnerability there is would take hundreds of pages of text, only 
the most prevalent ones are discussed.  
An underlying problem in 3G systems, UMTS and CDMA 2000, is the Signalling System 
No. 7 (SS7). SS7 is a set of protocols that are in charge of exchanging signaling 
messages in 3G systems. It was developed in 1975, when there was no wireless access 
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to networks and the security risks were less relevant than what they are today. SS7 has 
hardly been updated since then. This outdated standard is vulnerable to interception of 
SMS messages and calls, subscriber Denial of Service (DoS) and information disclosure 
attacks. SS7 has already been exploited by criminal entities, for example in Germany, 
bank accounts have been compromised by exploiting the two-factor authentication 
system used by German banks, which sends a code to a mobile phone before funds get 
transferred between accounts. [8] Network operators are aware of the problems caused 
by SS7 but are sometimes inadequately prepared to do anything about it. According to 
Positive Technologies network security analysis [9], only 30 percent of European telecom 
operators have implemented the GSM associations security recommendations. 
Solutions to these problems caused by SS7 seem to mainly be moving towards newer 
technologies in 4G and 5G, or actively monitoring and analyzing signaling traffic that 
crosses network boundaries to catch potential threats early. This implementation of 
monitoring is also included in the GSM associations recommendations.  
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4 FOURTH GENERATION OF WIRELESS CELLULAR 
TECHNOLOGY 
The first commercial release of 4G LTE was at the end of 2009 in Stockholm. [10] For a 
system to be called 4G, they must meet the criteria assigned by ITU. This criterion is 
called IMT-Advanced. The requirements include network speed qualifications, 100 Mbps 
for high mobility and 1 Gbps for low mobility, worldwide roaming capability and mobile 
devices with high quality, among other things. Performance requirements are a bit more 
diverse than this, and they are specified in the IMT-Advanced to the fullest. [1] 
The two 4G technologies are called LTE and Worldwide interoperability for Microwave 
Access (WiMAX). They both operate entirely on IP protocol and architecture, which 
makes them rather similar in how they work. They do differ from each other in security 
solutions. IP-based infrastructure brings with it a lot of potential security issues, so extra 
work must be put into the security mechanisms in both of these technologies to provide 
a secure and reliable communication line. LTE is backed up by 3GPP, whereas WiMAX 
is based on the 802.16 wireless broadband standards written by the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). [1] The two technologies were competitors, but in the 
end LTE took the title of dominating the area 4G, making WiMAX an obsolete technology. 
[11] 
There are many technologies that make 4G possible. Multiple-Input Multiple-Output 
(MIMO) is a key technology in the current 4G and 5G systems. It introduces the use of 
multiple antennas in both the transmitter and the receiver side. 4G also introduces the 
use of carrier aggregation and relays. Carrier aggregation means the use of multiple 
carriers simultaneously so that devices can use greater amount of data. A singular carrier 
provides 20 MHz bandwidth in LTE. Relays receive, demodulate and decode the data, 
apply any error corrections, then re-transmits a new signal so that the signal quality is 
enhanced. [12] The purpose of relays is to provide coverage in new areas, make 
temporary network areas and also to offer high data rave coverage and group mobility. 
[1] There are many other technologies that will be mentioned further down in the actual 
5G section, and the technologies mentioned will be expanded in there. 
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4.1 LTE security 
In the book A Comprehensive Guide to 5G Security, an excellent step-by-step picture of 
LTE authentication is provided. This picture is used to illustrate the authentication 
process in LTE, since explaining the method by just using words would be insufficient 
and confusing. In Picture 1 on the right side there is the User Equipment (UE), in the 
middle the authentication server, which starts the authentication process by sending an 
Enhanced Authentication Protocol (EAP) request, and on the left the certificate record, 
which generates the AKA-challenge message and sends it to the authentication server 
that sends it to the user. The picture is read top-down.  
 
Picture 1. Authentication Process in LTE [1]. 
The second part of LTE security is Non Access Stratum (NAS). It is designed to establish 
a secure connection between the UE and the mobile management entity across radio 
links. It also performs integrity checks and ciphering of the NAS messages. Different 
keys are used in order to perform integrity checks and ciphering. NAS keys are derived 
by UEs and mobile management entities. [13] 
The third part is the access stratum security. Its purpose is to safely deliver data between 
an UE and nodes. It performs integrity and ciphering checks of signaling messages in 
the control plane. Once again, different keys are used in order to perform integrity checks 
and ciphering of signaling messages and IP packets. [13] 
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4.2 WiMAX security 
WiMAX is not really used to this day anymore. However, it uses the 802.16 family of 
standards. The IEEE 802.16 protocol architecture consists of two main layers, the 
Medium Access Control (MAC) and the physical layer. MAC layer features 3 sub-layers, 
which are service specific convergence sublayer, MAC common part sublayer and 
security sublayer. The point of focus here is the security layer, which is in charge of key 
establishment and exchange, encryption and decryption as well as authentication. The 
security layer acts as an intermediary in between the MAC and physical layer, being in 
charge of the data exchanged. [14] 
In the security layer there are three WiMAX security features that are mentioned that 
protect the base station and UE. First of them is called security association, which is a 
set of security information parameters that the base station and UEs share. The security 
association contains a cryptographic identifier, initialization vectors and traffic encryption 
keys. Second security feature is the public key infrastructure. WiMAX uses privacy and 
key management protocol for key management, exchange and transfer among the 
mobile stations. It uses advanced encryption standard as its encryption algorithm. Third 
in the list is user authentication. It features three different types of authentications, where 
the first one is Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) based authentication. EAP based 
authentication is the second method, which is similar to the LTE authentication process. 
Third authentication type is a combination of the two previously mentioned, RSA and 
EAP. [14] 
4.3 4G vulnerability examples 
Whereas GSM networks were vulnerable to rogue base stations, LTE is assumed to offer 
confidentiality in that regard. However, LTE networks are vulnerable to threats that target 
privacy, authentication and availability. Although LTE does provide mutual authentication 
and strong encryption, it is sometimes wrongly assumed to be enough. LTE is still 
vulnerable to great deal of threats, such as location leaks, rogue base stations and 
protocol exploits. Despite the mutual authentication and strong encryption, a large 
portion of the control plane signaling messages are exchanged over the LTE radio link 
in clear sight. Before all the encryption and authentication steps can take place, a mobile 
device will start communicating with a LTE base station that advertises itself as a legit 
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base station, whether it is legit or not, leading to the users identity being compromised if 
it is indeed a rogue base station. This communication between the device and base 
station is vulnerable to sniffing. This type of an attack is also called an IMSI attack, and 
it continues to be a problem in 5G as well. [15]  
Another commonly known threat is the downgrading to a GSM connection. This attack 
exploits the Attach Reject and Attack Request messages, that allow the base station to 
block certain mobile devices if they engage in malicious behavior. However, this enables 
rogue base stations to use these messages as well, and this way they can disallow the 
device to connect to LTE services. This makes the device only attempt to connect to 
GSM base stations, which are less secure. This attack can also be done together with a 
GSM rogue base station, so that the attacker would be in complete control of the 
networks the user uses, and in this way enabling the possibility for eavesdropping 
everything that the user does, such as phone calls and text messages. These Attach 
Reject and Attack Request can also be used just to block users from accessing the 
network completely. [15] 
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5 FIFTH GENERATION OF WIRELESS CELLULAR 
TECHNOLOGY 
1G brought analog mobile voice calls. 2G added digital voice calls and SMS to that. 3G 
introduced mobile web browsing. 4G revolutionized the data speeds and brought mobile 
video consumption to all its users. The traffic of mobile data grows larger by the day, and 
4G alone is probably not going to be enough. Ericsson predicts that in 2023 there will be 
9 billion mobile subscriptions and 20 billion connected IoT devices. [16] In 2019 the 
number for global mobile subscriptions was approximately 5,2 billion and the amount of 
IoT devices was estimated to be 12 billion. [17] The presumed huge increase in these 
numbers is obviously going to generate more mobile data traffic, which demands more 
from the mobile network operators and from the technologies they use. As more devices 
get connected to the internet, security measures must be actively sought out and 
implemented. Next, the 5G enabling technologies are presented before moving on to the 
security aspects of 5G. 
5.1 5G enabling technologies 
There are certain requirements that must be met with the implementation of 5G. To list 
them, they are high data rate, ultra-low latency, massive connectivity, reliability and high 
availability, flexibility and programmability, energy and cost efficiency, spectrum 
efficiency, security and privacy. The development and implementation of different 
technology candidates happens in the Radio Access Network (RAN), the core network 
and in the end-to-end system. Many different standardization organizations, such as ITU, 
3GPP, IEEE, European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) are researching these different technologies and 
providing standards on which to base the systems to. Especially ITU continues its leading 
role in outlining the vision for 5G. ITU controls the IMT-2020 standard, which contains 
the requirements for 5G networks. [1] Picture 2 (reference) below compares the IMT-
Advanced, which includes the requirements for 4G LTE, and IMT-2020. It compares the 
key capabilities of both the requirement standards. We can see, that for example the 
area traffic capacity and network energy efficiency are predicted to increase hundredfold.  
21 
TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES THESIS | Taneli Vuori 
Picture 2. Comparison of capabilities between IMT-Advanced and IMT-2020 [18].  
5.1.1 Radio Access Network 
There are six enabling technologies for 5G RAN. First off, we have millimeter Wave 
(mmWave), which is a key feature in the 5G system. As 5G is going to have higher 
capacity in data rates, it requires more spectrum. Current systems are normally operating 
in the spectrum bands between 700 MHz and 3 GHz. This spectrum range is not 
sufficient for 5G, so the solution for this is to use higher bandwidth ranges, from 24 GHz 
to 100 GHz. This section of the spectrum is rarely used, so 5G has an open track ahead 
of it. The wavelengths of mmWave is between one and ten millimeters, so its penetration 
capabilities are quite weak. However, solutions to this have already been made, such as 
beamforming and massive MIMO, which are discussed in the following chapters. [1] 
Massive MIMO is a solution for the requirements of 5G when talking about network 
density and capacity enhancement. Basically, the solution is to deploy more antennas. 
Normal MIMO has already been utilized in 4G networks, where users are simultaneously 
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served by multiple antennas at once to enhance the signal. The change to 5G is the 
number of antennas used, that is that makes it massive. Beamforming is a technology 
which is part of massive MIMO. It means that the same signal is sent from multiple 
antennas at once, so the receiver will receive multiple copies of the same signal. This 
technology allows the signals to constructively sum up, which makes the signal stronger. 
This technology is also said to enhance energy efficiency, which obviously interests the 
network operators installing these required new antennas. [1] 
The third feature of RAN is called ultra-dense small cells technology. The purpose of 
these small cells is to bring the network closer to the users, making it easier to have good 
service in high traffic and hotspot areas. These small cells have a lot shorter coverage 
range, from couple tens of meters to couple hundred meters. This means there must be 
a lot of them, which poses challenges in terms of management and interference. [1] 
Fourth feature is Machine to Machine (M2M) and Device to Device (D2D) technologies. 
As mentioned previously, approximately two-thirds of all 5G related communication is 
going to happen M2M. M2M communication was already a thing in 4G LTE systems and 
continues to be that in 5G. M2M communication refers to the automated communication 
between machines. This communication method enables a number of different services, 
such as monitoring, automation, health care and automotive. M2M does have some 
challenges with security and privacy, as most of the time the machines spend their time 
unattended, which makes physical attacks possible. The machines usually also possess 
rather low capabilities in terms of energy and computing resources, and therefore they 
cannot implement complex security measures. D2D communication means a direct 
communication between two mobile devices, without going through a network 
framework. This means that the network framework in question has basically more 
capability to handle other requests, as it offloads some of the traffic to D2D 
communication. D2D offers improvements across the board, such as spectrum efficiency 
and user data rate gain. It is used in gaming, vehicular communications and proximity-
based applications, but also suffers from security problems. [1] 
Cloud-based RAN is the next technology. It offers a design for the radio access part of 
5G networks with reduced cost and energy efficiency. Cloud-RAN also provides better 
network speeds and capacities. The technology connects Remote Radio Heads (RRH) 
with high speed fibers to the baseband unit pool, which generates and processes a 
digitized radio frequency signal. This technology allows for flexibility, but has drawbacks, 
such as problems in placing the RRHs. [1] 
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Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) and its sibling fog computing are technologies that try to 
bring the services and processing capabilities to the perimeters of mobile networks, so it 
is as close to the end users as possible. The purpose of this is reduce latency as much 
as possible and produce an efficient network. For example, IoT, augmented reality and 
connected cars all require very low latencies, which MEC can provide. Fog computing is 
basically the same, but for cloud computing resources. Those resources are extended 
to the boundaries of the network, in order to achieve similar results as with MEC. [1] 
5.1.2 Mobile Core Network 
Software Defined Networking (SDN) is a rather new term, as its only been around beyond 
academia for a decade. [19] The idea is the physical separation of the data plane from 
the control plane, so the application layer, control layer and infrastructure layer are 
isolated. This allows for flexible and programmable network infrastructure, which in turn 
helps mobile operators bring new services and innovations as fast as possible to the end 
users. [1] 
Network Function Virtualizaton (NFV) introduces the ability to relocate network functions 
from costly hardware to cheaper software. This allows for virtualization of network 
devices. One of the reasons this technology exists is the massive reduction in cost, which 
impacts the revenue of mobile operators, so obviously they have an interest in this. NFV 
does also provide dynamic scaling of resources and faster deployment of new services. 
[1] SDN and NFV have some similarities in terms of virtualization and can be used 
together to further develop networking technologies, such as network slicing, which is 
discussed in the end-to-end system chapter. 
5.1.3 End-to-End system 
There are few key technologies for constructing an end-to-end system, and the first of 
them is network slicing. As 5G is expected to support different types of services and 
applications, slicing the network in sections can provide different features and network 
capabilities to different slices. These slices can have differences in data rates, mobility, 
reliability, latency and security. Each slice would be an end-to-end isolated system, which 
makes this a foundation to build 5G on. Network slices are expected to be logically 
isolated networks, so they could be programmed separately. Example use cases of 
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network slicing would be slices for enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB), ultra Reliable 
Low Latency Communications (uRLLC) and massive Machine Type Communications 
(mMTC). Basically, eMBB is for end users, uRLLC for autonomous cars and others that 
require low latency and mMTC for IoT. [1] 
5G is gaining more and more traction by the day, as in 2020 there are already multiple 
locations that have 5G connectivity available. For example, Finnish telecommunications 
company Elisa Oyj has already implemented 5G in couple of cities in Finland, such as 
Tampere, Helsinki and Turku. [20] With this being the case, Management and 
Orchestration (MANO) of the networks becomes relevant. MANO has already been in 
use in 4G networks and will be or is already in use in 5G networks. The role of MANO is 
managing all the network infrastructure in terms of security, performance, accounting, 
configuration and fault management. It is also in charge of network provisioning for the 
network slices in order to provide end-to-end connectivity. Current system used in 4G 
needs to be expanded in order for it to be sufficient for the 5G networks. [1] 
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6 5G SECURITY CHALLENGES AND POSSIBLE 
SOLUTIONS 
As the 5G network security is a large subject, the focus will be on the new technologies 
coming with 5G. Among the new technologies are terms such as SDN, NFV and mobile 
cloud, which are discussed in the previous chapters, and which will be opened a bit more 
in the following chapters. Privacy aspect of 5G is also discussed, as it is an interesting 
subject for the customers. 
6.1 New technologies: SDN, NFV and cloud systems 
Next Generation Mobile Networks (NGMN) is a mobile telecommunications association 
of research institutes, manufacturers, vendors and mobile operators, that was founded 
in 2006 to evaluate wireless network technologies candidates and develop common 
solutions for them. NGMNs objective is to assure a successful commercial launch of the 
mobile broadband networks with means like roadmaps and user trials. Its objective is 
also to support the standards organizations such as 3GPP and IEEE to help them 
understand what mobile operators need. NGMN has listed challenges for 5G in its white 
paper [21] that was released in 2015, and there it specifies SDN, NFV and mobile cloud 
to be technologies, that solve some of the upcoming or ongoing problems, such as 
network flexibility and virtualization of the mobile core network. 
Picture 3 (reference) overviews the 5G security threats with SDN, NFV and cloud 
systems in mind. It also includes columns links and privacy, where the former considers 
the links in between networks and the latter is about users’ privacy challenges. As we 
can see from this picture, there are a quite few of these, and some of the possible security 
threats are discussed in the upcoming chapters as examples.  
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Picture 3. 5G technology’s security challenges. [22] 
6.1.1 Challenges and potential solutions in SDN 
As previously discussed in chapter 5.1.2, SDN is a new technology that enables 
programmability and logical centralizing of the network control planes and enables the 
support for virtualization. SDN separates the data and control plane from each other. 
Although these technologies are key elements for 5G’s development, they do pose some 
security challenges with them. Network control centralization can make the controller a 
bottleneck for the entire network, making it an attack vector in terms of saturation attacks, 
such as DoS. Enabling programmability means that almost all the network functions can 
be carried out as SDN applications. With this being the case, there is a possibility that 
malicious applications are granted access or that Application Programming Interfaces 
(APIs) are exposed to unplanned software. If the API is exposed, it compromises the 
network function. 
One example of an attack is DoS attack. DoS attacks are a well-known attack type and 
it also is possible attack angle to SDN. DoS threats can occur in both the control and 
data plane. In the data plane DoS can be caused by attackers flooding the network 
elements of the SDN architecture. Most often the attack originates from compromised 
systems, often called botnets, which are basically a string of connected computers 
coordinated together to perform a task. These botnets are assigned to flood the targeted 
SDN with traffic, making the service slow down or halt completely. DoS can be produced 
at the control plane by congesting controllers through a big number of forged flow 
arrivals, causing the degradation and interruption of the network. [23]  
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There are options to deal with DoS attacks. Quick threat identification is essential in 
shutting down DoS attacks as fast as possible, and SDN provides this with one of 
features, which is packet level granulation. This provides transparency in a way that you 
are able to see the packet source, the route the packet takes and the content of the 
packet. These can be gathered from any network perimeter in SDN systems, whereas 
normally you would only gather these in the network entry points. Of course, the 
identification of DoS attack packets is still a problem, but as they get identified early on, 
a rapid response enables the system to route the traffic to intrusion detection system or 
to firewalls. [22] 
6.1.2 Challenges and potential solutions in NFV 
As talked previously, NFV is a technology that enabled virtualizing of network services, 
such as routers, firewalls and load balancers, which have traditionally run on proprietary 
hardware. With NFV the need for dedicated hardware for all the network functions 
ceases to exist, as the services are packaged as Virtual Machines (VMs) on commodity 
hardware. Although a great advancement in technology, this virtualization does open 
new threats in terms of security. [1] To avoid confusion, both NFV and Virtual Network 
Functions (VNFs) are mentioned in the upcoming paragraphs. NFV is the framework, 
that orchestrates and automates the VNFs. VNF is a single network function in a software 
form, such as router, firewall or load-balancer. VNFs are deployed as VMs. 
One of the security vulnerabilities with NFV is the dynamic nature of VNFs. This can lead 
to configuration errors and therefore security vulnerabilities. VNFs are also vulnerable to 
typical cyber-attacks, with example being DoS, sniffing and spoofing. With the 
virtualization comes also specific threats to NFV that are only applicable to virtualized 
environment. Some of these are flooding attacks, which fills the hosts memory by 
initiating incomplete packet connection requests, hypervisor hijacking, in which the 
attacker aims to take control over the hypervisor who is in charge of the virtual 
environment within a VM, and VM migration attacks, which aim to exploit VM images as 
they are moved between physical machines in the network. There can also be private 
deployments of this technology, where all remote access is prevented. In these cases, 
NFV is only vulnerable to malicious insiders, such as malicious administrators. [22]  
Another challenge is the trust factor in maintenance. The installation and configuration 
of the physical network devices is often handled by a trusted employee, and there is a 
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certain level of trust to the device, as it is bought from a retailer and it is tangible. 
However, as VNFs fetch the needed maintenance dynamically from the cloud, there must 
be some level of trust between the one who owns the VNF and the one that provides the 
maintenance to prevent any malicious VNFs from entering the system. [22] 
There are almost always as many solutions as there are challenges. In NFV systems, 
basic solutions to external threats are to use well configured firewall and intrusion 
detection systems. For internal threats, there are mitigation tools such as role-based 
access control, that defines the privileges for each role. Preventing infrastructural level 
attacks can be done with continuous monitoring of network resource consumption levels 
for each user and blocking malicious requests with a blacklist of IP addresses. 
Outsourcing sensitive information to external networks can be used in NFV to protect the 
information and validate data integrity. Cryptographic solutions, for example message 
stream encryption, can be utilized to assure the confidentiality of VNFs, which in turn 
makes the whole system that much easier to trust. Trust relationships are essential in 
increasing the trust among different entities in the NFV environment over its whole life 
cycle. [22] 
Although DoS is a big threat for NFV systems as well, a different example is used here. 
Misuse of resources, also titled resource theft in Picture 3, is a problem caused by the 
fact that not all the computing resources necessarily support the multi-tenancy 
requirements that the NFV users require. This can cause data leakage, abnormal activity 
and unavailability of the service. Another set of problems comes from the fact that 
hypervisor is in charge of the isolation and communications of the different entities that 
generate the VNFs. If hypervisor lacks security, there is a possibility that an attacker 
could alter the hypervisor to give the attacker extra resources. If the hypervisor fails to 
isolate users, an user X, attacker, could potentially send intensive traffic to user Y, 
making the user Y stop accessing the service, and thus freeing up the resources for user 
X. This is what is called a resource freeing attack, and the consequences can be 
bottlenecks in the resources, latency of service or even blocking the service completely. 
[24] 
A very simple solution for the resource theft attack is to have a hypervisor scheduler that 
offers share allocations among the processes, which limits the maximum amount of data 
a user can have for each virtual service. This makes a single user unavailable to exploit 
any type of misusing of resources. However, this solution affects the performance of the 
service. [24] 
29 
TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES THESIS | Taneli Vuori 
6.1.3 Challenges and potential solutions in mobile cloud systems and MEC 
As the cloud computing systems include diverse resources that are shared among the 
users, there exists a possibility for a user to spread malicious traffic to affect the 
performance of the system, access resources of other users or consume more 
resources. Also, conflicts in network configurations can happen in multi-tenant cloud 
networks where the users have their own control logic. Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC) 
is an approach that migrates the core concepts of cloud computing in to the 5G systems. 
The architectural and infrastructural modifications that are made in 5G do pose 
challenges in terms of security, as the mobile clouds need to change in order to perform 
in the 5G systems. The openness and versatility of MCC can backfire, as more 
vulnerabilities are created, and privacy of mobile clouds can be compromised. [25] 
For the MCC systems, the threats can be categorized in to three different sections, 
namely front-end, back-end and network-based threats. The front-end consists of user 
platform which includes the mobile terminal on which the applications and interfaces are 
run in order to gain access to the cloud facilities. The threats to front-end cloud segment 
can be either physical or application based. Physical threats include the compromising 
of the actual mobile device or other integrated hardware components. Application based 
threats consist of spyware, malware or some other malicious software, that are used in 
order to gain information from the users or disrupt the service the application provides. 
The back-end part of the MCC is a collection of data storage systems, cloud servers, 
VMs, hypervisor and protocols that are needed to offer cloud services. Security threats 
mainly affect mobile cloud servers. Examples of threats to back-end are XML DoS and 
data replication to HTTP. Network-based mobile security threats target the radio access 
technologies that connect the mobile devices to the cloud. These technologies include 
the older ones, such as 4G LTE and Wi-Fi, or the newer ones coming with 5G. There are 
several attacks threatening this area, such as DoS, session hijacking or Wi-Fi sniffing. 
[25] 
MEC is still in its infancy and there exists a lot of different MEC technologies. This 
combination leads to the existence of potential malicious activity and privacy issues. 
Extending the cloud computing capabilities to the outskirts of the mobile networks is what 
MEC does. The amount of protection that can be provided to the edge hosts is not on 
par with traditional data centers, where all the machines and systems are centralized. 
The two biggest security concerns for MEC is the IoT environment enabled by the cloud 
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systems and the open APIs from where all the content is brought to MEC end users and 
applications. The implementation of open APIs may create security vulnerabilities in the 
form of man-in-the-middle attack, DoS attack, privacy leakages and VM manipulation 
attacks. MEC security is considered to be a top priority for the developers, as exploiting 
MEC may cause enormous amounts of damage. [22] 
Solutions for both MCC and MEC have been proposed. In MCC, many of the proposals 
by standardization bodies, such as 3GPP, deal with the strategic use of different 
virtualization technologies, the dynamic allocation of data handling and the design and 
redesign of encryption methods. As VMs are used to connect to the virtual instances in 
the cloud, the security here is provided by isolating each user’s virtual connection from 
others. For specifics threats, learning-based systems can be better than generic 
approaches. Learning-based systems take samples of packets, analyze them and learn 
certain attributes that are typical for malicious packets. This is a good solution to a DoS 
attack for example. As for the user’s equipment, anti-malware ought to be installed to the 
devices or served from the cloud. As for application security, several different 
frameworks of implementations have been proposed, such as dynamic credential 
generation for identity protection, in-device spatial cloaking technology for privacy and 
overall frameworks produced by different cloud system providers. For MEC, there is less 
works that are made in terms of security. The usage of gateways in the networks at 
strategic points is recommended, such as IoT gateway. The applications that are hosted 
in the edges of the network should authenticate all the users attempting a connection. 
The MEC server itself should be configured in a way that protects the applications and 
data storage units from malicious activity. [22] 
Signaling storm is an example of an attack that can be targeted at a cloud system. Mobile 
networks control plane is vulnerable to this type of attack. The attacks goal is to overload 
the control plane using traffic patterns, which causes the service to become extremely 
slow or unavailable. This differs from DoS attack, as DoS attack may target some other 
part of network, whereas signaling storm targets the control plane. Signaling storm may 
be caused by botnets or malware. Signaling storm can also be caused by mishap in 
developing an application. If a mobile application is designed in a way, that does not take 
into account the specifics of mobile networks, they may inadvertently cause a signaling 
overload. An example of this is the first release of Angry Birds on android devices, where 
the in-game advertisements caused excessive load due to frequent communication [26]. 
As said previously, these storms can be caused by a malware. Some examples in this 
31 
TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES THESIS | Taneli Vuori 
field are e-mail and SMS spammers, adware, botclients and premium service abusers. 
All the formerly mentioned generate small amounts of traffic, but they do it often. This 
requires repetitive allocation and deallocation of radio channels, which may lead to a 
negative impact in the control plane. [27] 
One possible solution for signaling storms specifically is a software, that is installed in 
the signaling system or within the mobile devices. After repetitive high bandwidth 
requests are noticed, and the requests transfer no data or voice, the software would 
block the mobile device from trying to make another request. This not only defies the 
signaling storms, but also limits the energy consumption in the network and battery 
consumption of the mobile devices. [28] 
6.1.4 Privacy problems and solutions in 5G 
Privacy has been a talking point in previous technologies and continues to be one in 5G, 
as it is one of the subjects that everyone can chime in on. From the point of view of the 
users, the concerns arise from identity, data and location of your personal information. 
Many of the mobile phone applications these days require you to give them some sort of 
personal information before you can even download it. It is not often mentioned how and 
where the data is stored or for what purpose it is used. This gives users a veil of shadow 
and uncertainty considering their own personal information.  
Attacks such as boundary attacks, timing attacks and semantic information attacks target 
the location section of the privacy. The location privacy can be leaked on the physical 
layer level because of the access point selection in 5G. If a malicious station is selected, 
the user’s privacy is compromised. Attacks targeted at IMSI are threats as well. They 
aim to reveal the identity of the owner of the device that is targeted by this catching 
attack. For example, this type of attack can be carried out by using a fake base station 
which the user’s device prefers if it has lost its TMSI. In this case, the device will send its 
IMSI to the fake base station, and IMSI contains the identity of the user. 5G networks 
also have a little bit of discrepancy between the different service provides, as the 5G 
networks have three different areas of providers. There are Communication Service 
Providers (CSPs), Virtual Mobile Network Operators (VMNOs) and network 
infrastructure providers. All these entities have different standards for their security 
policies, which can prove to be quite problematic. In the technologies leading up to 5G 
the mobile operators had full control of their system components. 5G mobile operators 
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are losing this full control of the privacy and security aspects, and therefore user privacy 
can be challenged where the same infrastructure is shared among different entities, such 
as VMNOs. Also, as there are no physical boundaries in the 5G networks as it uses NFV 
and cloud-based data storage, the different countries policies for data privacy might lead 
to users data being compromised as it is stored in the cloud in a different country. [22] 
To preserve the user privacy, an agreement between users, service providers, 
application providers, network operators and many others, needs to be made when 
dealing with data usage and data storage. This requires transparency, openness and 
accountability from all sides. Mobile operators especially need to focus on having 
capabilities to store more sensitive data locally and less sensitive data in public clouds 
for example. Location privacy must be protected by using anonymity-based technologies 
where the users real identity should be replaced with pseudonyms. Encryption and 
location cloaking here are essential. For IMSI attacks specifically, TMSI should be used 
wherever applicable, as it is randomly generated by certain time intervals, and thus 
harder to track back to the user. The standardization process of making the 5G networks 
secure for users happens at three levels: Governmental level, where country and multi-
national specific regulations are made, industry level, which includes certain 
standardization groups such as 3GPP and ETSI, and the consumer level, where the 
users themselves demand certain level of privacy. [22] 
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7 CONCLUSION 
The goal of this thesis was to build an understanding of mobile wireless technologies 
that preceded 5G, and subsequently give an understanding of the new technologies 
coming with 5G and their security challenges. This thesis also discussed the privacy 
challenges coming with 5G. Potential solutions are presented in this thesis for the NFV, 
SND, cloud computing and MEC technologies as well as privacy. The information used 
in this thesis consisted mainly of research papers on the subject. 
This thesis provides a basic knowledge of technologies preceding 5G and their security 
features. This thesis gives information about the new technologies coming with 5G, and 
their security challenges and potential solutions. This research should also give some 
level of understanding of who is in charge of the implementation and what sort of 
hierarchy exists in terms of standardizing network security. 
These challenges mainly concern customers and other 5G service buyers, as they are 
the ones that actually suffer the consequences if vulnerabilities are not found out before 
they are exploited. Therefore, mobile operators must be held to a high standard by their 
service users, so they do not economize on security features. 
The future of 5G is what is exciting. In the upcoming years it will be deployed in cities 
and perhaps even in dense urban areas. As this technology is rolled out, more research 
needs to be carried out as vulnerabilities are found. As the use cases for 5G are many, 
a good research topic for the future could be the level of security needed for each IoT 
device, as IoT related technology is starting to escalate.  
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